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Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance
of EU Democracy Promotion
ANNE WETZEL & JAN ORBIE
Abstract. This article introduces this special issue on the substance of EU democracy
promotion. It explains the research question that is central to this special issue: What is
the democratic substance that the EU furthers in third countries? First, we provide a
review of the literature, arguing that existing studies have mainly focused on the impact
and strategies of EU democracy promotion without sufficiently analysing the very
substance it furthers in third countries and regions. While academic research has made
a rough distinction between a broad and a limited notion of democracy promotion,
scholars have not yet systematically and comparatively analysed this topic. Second, we
develop a conceptual framework in order to ‘map’ the substance of EU democracy
promotion. Starting from a liberal conception of democracy and based on an adaptation
of the model of ‘embedded democracy’, different components, types and agendas of
democracy promotion are identified. Third, we formulate a number of expectations on
the substance of democracy advanced by the EU, focusing in particular on the distinction
between a ‘one-size-fits-all’ and a differentiation scenario. This article ends with a
summary of the different contributions to the special issue.
I Introduction1
Democracy promotion in third countries has been on the agenda of the EU since
the early 1990s.2 Over the past twenty years, EU democracy promotion activities
 Post-doctoral Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES),
University of Mannheim.
 Professor at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University.
1 This article is part of a broader project on the substance of EU democracy promotion, which is
partly funded through the Swiss National Science Foundation and the European Commission’s Jean
Monnet programme (see <www.eu-ipods.eu>). It has benefited from comments by Federica Bicchi,
Maurizio Carbone, Tina Freyburg, Amichai Magen, Susan Stewart and discussions with Francis Baert,
Fabienne Bossuyt, Karen Del Biondo, Jack McMartin, Eline De Ridder, Vicky Reynaert, An Schrijvers,
and Syuzanna Vasilyan. We also thank the audiences of the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU
Politics 2010, the UACES Annual Conference 2010 and the EUSA Twelfth Biennial International
Conference 2011 for valuable suggestions.
2 EU democracy promotion refers to the activities of EU institutions and does not include the
respective activities of EU Member States.
have substantiated through a ‘learning by doing’ process.3 Today, scholars speak
of ‘democracy mainstreaming’ because in its bilateral and multilateral relations
the EU demands a commitment to democracy and has differentiated instruments
in place to promote it.4
With the development of the EU’s democracy promotion policy a vast
academic literature has emerged on the topic. Whereas many studies have
focussed on the impact and effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in third
countries,5 others have dealt with the EU as a democracy promoter itself and in
particular with its democracy promotion instruments and strategies.6
However, despite the extensive literature on EU democracy promotion, there
is hardly any comprehensive and comparative study on the substance that the
EU furthers. On the one hand, analysis of European democracy promotion ‘often
gets stuck at a rather abstract level, involving the description of a ‘European
approach’ that is said to be gradual, development-oriented and based on positive
engagement and partnership’.7 On the other hand, even though scholars have
made more precise suggestions regarding the normative principles that the EU
promotes they admit that their claims would have to be tested empirically.8 As
we will summarize below, the literature has so far made a rough distinction
between a ‘limited’ and a ‘broad’ notion of democracy as the foundation of EU
democracy promotion. The EU itself has been discussing the adoption of an
official definition of the concept as a basis for its external democracy promotion
3 T.A. Bo¨rzel & T. Risse, ‘Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union’s Approaches to
Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective’, in Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law:
American and European Strategies, ed. A. Magen, T. Risse & M. McFaul (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 34–60.
4 A. Ju¨nemann & M. Knodt, ‘Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung durch die Europa¨ische Union. Ost-
und Mitteleuropa, Mittelmeer, Lateinamerika, Karibik, Afrika und Asien im Vergleich – ein
Tagungsbericht’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Internationale Beziehungen 13, no. 1 (2006): 113.
5 For example, F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert & H. Knobel, ‘Costs, Commitment and Compli-
ance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, Journal of
Common Market Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 495–518; F. Schimmelfennig & H. Scholtz, ‘EU
Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood. Political Conditionality, Economic Devel-
opment and Transnational Exchange’, European Union Politics 9, no. 2 (2008): 187–215; T.
Freyburg et al., ‘EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood’, Journal of
European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 916–934; H. Grabbe, ‘How Does Europeanization Affect
CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’, Journal of European Public Policy 8,
no. 6 (2001): 1013–1031; M.A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Inte-
gration since 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6 For example, contributions in A. Ju¨nemann & M. Knodt (eds), Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung
durch die Europa¨ische Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007) and Magen, Risse & McFaul (eds),
supra n. 3.
7 R. Youngs, ‘Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?’, CEPS Working Document
292 (Brussels, 2008): 2.
8 I. Manners, ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs 84, no. 1
(2008): 45–60.
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efforts but has not yet done so.9 Thus, we still have a limited understanding of what
is actually being promoted by the EU towards whom. This special issue addresses
the shortcomings in the existing literature. By ‘substance of democracy promotion’
we mean the substantive content that is being promoted by the EU towards a third
country or region through various activities and which, regardless of the EU’s
success, has the potential to advance the establishment of democracy within this
country.10 As we will elaborate in more detail below, the substance promoted by the
EU may be the same or may differ across countries and regions. However, taking
this variation into account, our main focus is on ‘liberal democracy’.
We will not investigate whether the EU is successful in democracy promotion.
The research on the content of EU democracy promotion rather than its impact is
not only motivated by the lack of systematic attention to the substance in the
literature (see above), but also by two additional reasons. First, the question about
what the EU promotes is prior to the question about the results of EU democracy
promotion efforts and can thus be analysed independently. This also takes into
account that the result of EU democracy promotion is not necessarily what it has
intended. However, scholars and commentators often evaluate the impact of EU
democracy promotion policies without explicitly acknowledging what kind of
democracy the EU has in mind.
Second, we contend that a deeper analysis of the substance of the EU’s
democracy promotion helps to better understand the nature of the EU as an actor
in the world.11 We are interested in what the EU does in the first place because
this will tell us something about the EU as an actor with a distinct and norma-
tively charged foreign policy culture and bearer of different foreign policy roles,
among others the role of a democracy promoter.12 To put it bluntly: even if the
EU’s democracy promotion policies have no impact whatsoever on third
9 M. Meyer-Resende & J. Wisniewska, Democracy Revisited. Which Notion of Democracy for
the EU’s External Relations? (Brussels: Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2009).
10 Note that our usage of the term ‘substance’ does not include issues of implementation in third
countries. It thus differs from usages that understand ‘substantive democracy’ or ‘democratic
substance’ as a second step after the transfer of ‘formal democracy’ or ‘democratic forms’ as
found in M. Kaldor & I. Vejvoda, ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries’,
International Affairs 73, no. 1 (1997): 59–82, and P. Uvin, Human Rights and Development
(Bloomfeld: Kumarian Press, 2004), 98–99. Also, our focus on activities that have the potential
to advance the establishment of liberal democracy means that we do not look systematically at EU
discourse on democracy promotion. While we do not neglect what the EU is saying, we focus
mostly on what it is doing and largely ignore the impact it has in third countries.
11 See also S. Lucarelli, ‘Introduction. Values, Principles, Identity and European Union Foreign
Policy’, in Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, ed. S. Lucarelli & I. Manners
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.
12 A. Ju¨nemann, ‘Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung im su¨dlichen Mittelmeerraum: Ein rollentheor-
etischer Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r die Kluft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit in den EU-
Außenbeziehungen’, in Der Nahe Osten im Umbruch. Zwischen Transformation und Autoritarismus,
ed. M. Beck et al. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 151–174.
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countries, the pursued democracy-related objectives can still tell us something
about the EU’s international role. The research will in particular help us assess
the EU’s actual behaviour as distinct from its impact.13
In the literature on the EU’s foreign policy the special character of this
policy is often stressed – be it as ‘normative’, ‘civilizing’ or ‘ethical’.14
Existing studies bring up several questions that are also relevant for our anal-
ysis on the substance of EU democracy promotion. For example, several
scholars are pointing to the EU’s disregard of ‘normative’ goals when over-
riding interests are concerned.15 Can we detect such inconsistencies also with
respect to the substance of EU democracy promotion, for example, by opting
for more technocratic and less political contents when major EU or Member
State interests are at stake?
Furthermore, it has been suggested to speak of the EU as a normative power only
when its policy is inclusive and reflexive.16 This implies that EU policy makers, on
the one hand, involve those affected by the external action in its formulation and,
on the other hand, try to anticipate the consequences on the ground and adapt the
policy accordingly. Is such an approach reflected in the content of the EU’s
democracy promotion activities? Or do we observe the opposite, namely unreflex-
ive behaviour and an ‘our democracy fits all’ approach?17 What, then, would this
form of democracy be?
Despite the existence of a mainstream liberal democratic approach to democracy
promotion, scholars have observed that the specific model that is being promoted by
an actor is often similar to the respective domestic political system: ‘It seems an
endemic feature of western democracy promotion efforts that assistance providers
promote what they know and admire most, which is almost always their own
country’s particular approach to democracy’.18 For the EU as a democracy pro-
moter, such an assumption cannot easily be made. The EU institutions do not
13 This corresponds with what Elgstro¨m and Smith call the performance of the EU’s role.
O. Elgstro¨m & M. Smith, ‘Introduction’, in The European Union’s Roles in International
Politics: Concepts and Analysis, ed. O. Elgstro¨m & M. Smith (London, New York: Routledge,
2006), 1–10.
14 H. Sjursen, ‘What Kind of Power?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 169–181.
15 For example, G.R. Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of
‘‘Europe’’: Limits to International Idealism’, Democratization 7, no. 2 (2000): 142–167; K.E.
Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity,
2008), 165–167; A. Warkotsch, ‘Non-compliance and Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy
Promotion’, Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 2 (2008): 227–245.
16 T. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘‘Normative Power
Europe’’’, Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005): 613–636; Manners, 2008, supra n. 8.
17 F. Bicchi, ‘‘‘Our Size fits All’’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean’, Journal of
European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 286–303.
18 T. Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy’, Democratization 4, no. 3
(1997): 121–122; for the same argument see R. Youngs, ‘Trends in Democracy Assistance. What
Has Europe Been Doing?’, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (2008): 166–167.
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represent a model of liberal democracy that can be projected on third countries.
Rather, the EU faces difficulties itself to clearly define what it understands by
‘democracy’. However, at the same time, it has been found to rely on external
standards such as those from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).19 Again, which consequences does this have for the particular
content that the EU furthers in third countries?
This special issue takes up the above mentioned points and explores the
following research question:
What is the democratic substance that the EU furthers in third countries? It
presents the results of the first phase of a broader project. However, beyond
this, it will also tentatively address the project’s second research question of
how we can explain the democratic substance(s) promoted by the EU in third
countries.
II The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Between a Broad and a
Limited Notion
Scholars have not yet systematically and comparatively analysed the very sub-
stance that the EU promotes under its democracy promotion agenda. Rather, EU
democracy promotion literature has been concerned with the strategies and
instruments of EU democracy promotion and its impact in third countries.
Nevertheless, the substantive content that the EU promotes has been the topic
of single pieces of work. On the basis of this literature, a broad EU definition of
democracy promotion can be distinguished from a limited conception.
On the one hand, scholars see EU democracy promotion to encompass a
variety of different aspects. Although there is no common definition of what a
broad view of democracy promotion includes, Carothers summarizes that it:
rests on a broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about
equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a slow, iterative
process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic
developments. It favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-term
change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently
emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state.20
Especially in comparison with US democracy promotion he stresses this
supposedly particular substance of the EU’s policy. In a similar vein, Youngs
maintains that while a direct comparison between EU and US democracy
19 Smith, supra n. 15, at 153–154.
20 T. Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?’, Journal of Democ-
racy 20, no. 1 (2009): 1.
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promotion is hardly possible it is evident that EU democracy promotion ‘initia-
tives are often defined in a variety of ways and combine democracy assistance
with governance, human rights, and civil society support’.21
On the other hand, there are numerous examples in the literature that point to a
rather limited conceptualization of EU democracy promotion. Contrary to a broad,
all-encompassing view, EU democracy promotion has also been characterized as
tending to be apolitical and oblique, targeting democracy indirectly through initia-
tives focussing on governance aspects or social issues.22 With regard to the
concrete example of democracy promotion in the Middle East, Youngs concludes
that ‘European approaches have exhibited a socio-economic, techno-governance
character’.23 A similar tendency has been described for the broader Middle East
and North Africa region where political reform is (was) not an EU priority. This is
reflected by the little attention that is paid to the benchmarking of political reform
in the framework of the ENP Action Plans and the fact that ‘aid classified
as ‘‘political assistance’’ related only indirectly to democracy’.24 Crawford, who
analysed EU democracy promotion in Ghana, concludes that ‘the European Com-
munity’s own development cooperation programme in this country has a minimal
focus on democracy and governance issues. [ . . . ] Overall, EC cooperation remains
a traditional development aid programme, with almost no political component’.
Instead of interpreting this strategy as resting on a broad notion of democracy,
Crawford argues that democracy in this case ‘is narrowly conceived by the EU,
being more concerned with limiting state power than extending popular control’.25
The limited understanding takes its most extreme form when the EU supports
unconnected diverse items such as ‘border controls in the southern Mediterra-
nean, reconstruction in the Balkans or religious dialogue with Muslim states’26
under a democracy promotion agenda.
Conversely, a limited conceptualization could also mean that the EU leans
towards ‘electoralism’,27 that is, exclusively focuses on ‘elections’ without
considering other dimensions of liberal democracy and contextual factors. Such
a ‘myopic strategy [ . . . ] – funding only elections and providing only short-term
21 Youngs, 2008, ‘Trends in Democracy Assistance’, supra n. 18, at 160.
22 Ibid., 165–166.
23 R. Youngs, ‘Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform’, in Uncharted Journey.
Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, ed. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment, 2005), 245.
24 H. Amirah-Ferna´ndez & I. Mene´ndez, ‘Reform in Comparative Perspective: US and EU
Strategies of Democracy Promotion in the MENA Region after 9/11’, Journal of Contemporary
European Studies 17, no. 3 (2009): 328, 332.
25 G. Crawford, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Case of
Ghana’, The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 4 (2005): 580, 573.
26 Youngs, 2008, ‘Is European Democracy Promotion’, supra n. 7, at 14.
27 T.L. Karl, ‘Electoralism’, in The International Encyclopedia of Elections, ed. R. Rose
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 95–96.
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aid’ has been rejected for both the EU and the United States. In fact, EU funding
for elections is not disproportionately high and only one aspect among
others.28 However, other scholars emphasize that the ‘electoralist fallacy’,
that is, the belief in elections as a ‘quick fix’ because they are a technical,
relatively inexpensive procedure that can be organized rapidly and quantified
easily also applies to the EU. For example, aid sanctions have mostly been
taken following failed elections or coups d’e´tat. Human rights also figured
among the official motives to suspend aid in most cases, however, these were
typically civil and political rights closely linked to the electoral process.29
In an analysis of European Community democracy assistance projects that
were carried out between 1994 and 1997, Crawford found that European
Community aid was largely dominated by electoral assistance measures,
while neglecting the legislative and executive arms of government.30 Simi-
larly, Herrero reveals a significant increase of European Instrument (formerly
Initiative) for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) allocations to Electoral
Observation Missions between 2000 and 2007 (after which allocations were
restricted to 25%).31
III Mapping the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion
In our analysis of the substance of EU democracy promotion, we deliberately
confine ourselves to liberal democracy, which is only one particular and histor-
ically specific model of democracy.32 Some explanations on this choice of the
focus are in order. While there exist a number of other models, such as deliber-
ative democracy, participatory democracy, and direct democracy,33 we decided
to focus on liberal democracy because ‘[w]hen democracy is called for it is
overwhelmingly a liberal democratic model of democracy that is advocated’.34
This relates to a number of international democracy promoters including the EU
28 Youngs, 2008, ‘Trends in Democracy Assistance’, supra n. 18, at 165.
29 C. Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2010).
30 G. Crawford, ‘European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy’,
in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, ed. P. Burnell (London:
Frank Cass, 2000), 110.
31 S. Herrero, ‘A Decade of Democracy Promotion through the European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights’, The EPD Working Papers Series on Democracy Support, no. 1 (2009), 17.
32 A.J. Ayers, ‘‘‘We All Know a Democracy When We See One’’: (Neo)liberal Orthodoxy in the
‘‘Democratisation’’ and ‘‘Good Governance’’ Project’, Policy and Society 27, no. 1 (2008): 1–13;
B. Parekh, ‘Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy’, in Prospects for Democracy. North,
South, East, West, ed. D. Held (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), 156–175.
33 For example, D. Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).
34 M. Kurki, ‘Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democ-
racy in Democracy Promotion’, International Studies Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 365.
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whose approach is ‘liberal democratic in its core’.35 The choice was thus not
made in an ‘uncritical manner’.36 Rather, we think that because this model is so
prominently announced it deserves further and critical study. As the previous
section has shown there is a surprising variation within the accounts that scholars
give of the ‘liberal’ substance that the EU promotes in third countries, which
calls for more detailed analysis. This should not be equated with an approval of the
EU’s policy nor an (implicit) acknowledgement of liberal democracy as a universal
and superior democratic model. Furthermore, this choice should not be misunder-
stood in the way that the EU does only promote liberal democracy. In fact, research-
ers studying EU democracy promotion have in the past years also given increased
attention to elements that are stressed by other models, such as participatory democ-
racy.37 Nevertheless, even in the studied cases the EU did not abandon liberal
democracy as the main model that is to be promoted. It would certainly be interesting
to investigate in further research how far EU democracy promotion also takes up
elements particularly stressed by other models, for example, ‘deliberative capacity’
as suggested by Dryzek.38 As a first step, however, we consciously confine our
analysis to the model that dominates the democracy promotion practice.
Liberal democracy, however, is not an exactly defined concept. There are
numerous attempts to pinpoint its core meaning. According to Held, the cluster of
rules and institutions that characterize liberal democracy can be summarized to
include elected government, free and fair elections with equal voting rights for
citizens, universal suffrage, freedom of conscience, information, and expression,
the right to stand for office and associational autonomy.39 Others define liberal
democracy more broadly and put emphasis on additional aspects such as rule of
law, equality under the law, independent judiciary, checks and balances and
horizontal accountability, rights of expression for minorities and disadvantaged
majorities, multiple and ongoing channels for citizens’ expression and represen-
tation, substantial freedom of speech, publication, and petition.40
In order to map the substance of EU democracy promotion, we take as point of
departure the democracy models developed by Linz and Stepan as well as
35 Ibid.; see also Ayers, supra n. 32, at 3; Carothers, 2008, supra n. 18; T. Risse, ‘Conclusions:
Towards Transatlantic Democracy Promotion?’, in Magen, Risse & McFaul (eds), supra n. 3, at 249.
36 Kurki, supra n. 34, at 364.
37 Freyburg et al., supra n. 4; A. Wetzel, ‘The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the
EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral Economic Interests?’, Democratization 18
(2011).
38 J.S. Dryzek, ‘Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building’, Comparative Political
Studies 42, no. 11 (2009): 1379–1402.
39 Held, supra n. 33, at 94.
40 L. Diamond, Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 11–12; F. Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 76,
no. 6 (1997): 22–43.
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Merkel.41 Both works have a broad conceptualization of liberal democracy
and systematize its different elements, respectively in ‘five arenas’ and build-
ing on one precondition (Linz & Stepan) and in five ‘partial regimes’ and
three context conditions (Merkel). The authors stress that these areas are
‘mutually reinforcing’42 and that democracy is ‘a complex of interdependent
and independent partial regimes’43 that are mutually embedded and at the same
time embedded into a broader environment. Such an analytical approach offers
several advantages. First, it clearly distinguishes between democracy proper
and its context. Adapting this approach to EU democracy promotion allows us
to conceptually keep apart EU support of democracy’s core institutions and
democracy enhancing external conditions. Second, within the notion of democ-
racy, these approaches suggest the distinction of separate arenas or regimes.
In the context of EU democracy promotion, this enables us to more exactly
break down the substance. Furthermore, through the distinction of areas it
becomes possible to answer the question of whether the EU is responsive to
the situation in the third country when it devises the substance that it wants to
promote.
Although both conceptualizations overlap, they also differ, in particular with
regard to the question of whether some issues belong to the definitional core or the
context of democracy, and the fine graining of categories. For Linz and Stepan, the
five conditions for a democracy are civil society, political society, rule of law, state
apparatus, and economic society. Democracy, in turn, is dependent on the existence
of a state.44 The model of embedded democracy maintains that ‘liberal democracy
consists of five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political rights of
participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the
effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representa-
tives’.45 Furthermore, it accounts for the issues of stateness, civil society, and
social and economic requisites that have an influence on the quality of democracy
but ‘are not defining components of the democratic regime itself’.46 The following
figure illustrates the concept:
41 J.J. Linz & A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996); W. Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’, Democratization 11, no. 5
(2004): 33–58. Please note that these frameworks were not originally developed to describe the
substance of democracy promotion. However, we maintain that they offer a valuable starting point
for this endeavour.
42 Linz & Stepan, supra n. 41, at 7.
43 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 43.
44 Linz & Stepan, supra n. 41, Ch. 1.
45 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 37.
46 Ibid., 44.
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For our purposes, we decided to follow Merkel’s model but adapt it with a view
to the aspects from Linz and Stepan’s conceptualization of the five areas. This
was mainly done for three reasons. First, Merkel’s model turned out to be more
accurate. For instance, it allows us to distinguish more clearly between civil
rights and civil society and to disaggregate complex issues such as the rule of
law. Second, we do not follow Linz and Stepan’s suggestion to include an
institutionalized market into the definition of democracy but rather see them as
Figure 1 The Concept of Embedded Democracy (Adapted, Based on Merkel47)
Social and economic requisites 
Civil society 
Stateness 
 - Monopoly of legitimate physical force  - Usable bureaucracy/ functioning administration 
 - Absence of corruption   - Good governance 
   - Absence 
   of tutelary 
   powers and 
   reserved 
   domains 
- Democratic control over military and police 
- Presence of an active civil society
- Developed economy - Prevention of extreme poverty
- Fair distribution of a) the material resources of society and b) cognitive resources of society,
 in particular means of and access to education
Effective power to govern 
Political rights 
- Freedom of: speech, press, association, 
demonstration, petition 
- Existence of influential private media 
besides public media 
- No politically motivated censorship 
   - Political 
   parties 
- Horizontal 
separation of powers 
- Independent 
authority/ courts, 
authorized to execute 
judicial review of 
legislative (surveillance 
of norms) and executive 
(surveillance of bureaucracy) activity 
Horizontal accountability 
Civil rights 
- Individual rights of protection of life, 
freedom and property 
- Protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, 
terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into 
personal life 
- Equal access to the 
law and equal 
treatment by the law 
Electoral Regime 
- universal, inclusive active suffrage 
- universal, passive right to vote 
(right to candidacy) 
- correctly organized free and fair 
elections 
- elected representatives 
47 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 37.
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distinct issues.48 Third, this model helps to take up the distinction between broad
and limited notions of EU democracy promotion that have been outlined in the
previous section. In the following paragraphs, we briefly summarize the five
partial regimes and three context regimes that constitute ‘embedded, liberal
democracy’, and along which we will structure our analysis of the substance of
EU democracy promotion.49
The electoral regime has the central position of the five partial regimes since it
is necessary, but not sufficient, for democratic governing. Following Dahl, Merkel
outlines four supporting elements of this regime: universal, active suffrage;
universal, passive right to vote; free and fair elections and elected representatives.
The most closely connected partial regime is constituted by the political
liberties that go beyond the right to vote. Most basically, they include the right
to political communication and organization, that is, press freedom and the right
to association. These define how meaningful the process of preference formation
is in the public arena.
The third partial regime consists of the civil rights that are central to the rule of
law, that is, the ‘containment and limitation of the exercise of state power’. Most
fundamentally, this includes that individual liberties are not violated by the state
and the equality before the law. Connected to these points is the existence of
independent courts.
The fourth connected partial regime consists divisions of power and horizontal
accountability. This implies that ‘elected authorities are surveyed by a network of
relatively autonomous institutions and may be pinned down to constitutionally
defined lawful action’.50 The horizontal separation of powers thus amends the
vertical control mechanisms of elections and public sphere. Particular emphasis is
put on the limitations to executive power. Central to this partial regime is the
existence of an independent and functional judiciary to review executive and
legislative acts.
The last partial regime is the effective power to govern. This means that it is
the elected representatives that actually govern and that actors not subject to
democratic accountability should not hold decision-making power. In particular,
there should be no tutelary powers and reserved policy domains.51
48 Confer D. Beetham, ‘Market Economy and Democratic Polity’, Democratization 4, no. 1
(1997): 76–93.
49 For the next paragraphs, see Merkel, supra n. 41, at 38–39.
50 Ibid., 40; see also L. Morlino, ‘What Is a ‘‘Good’’ Democracy?’, Democratization 11, no. 5
(2004): 18.
51 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 41–42; see also J.S. Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Post-
Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions’, in Issues in Democratic
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. S. Main-
waring, G. O’Donnell & J.S. Valenzuela (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1992), 57–104.
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While these five partial regimes are understood to be the defining components
of a democracy, there are some more conditions that, while not part of the
definition itself, shape the ‘environment that encompasses, enables, and stabilizes
the democratic regime’.52 A damage of these conditions might lead to defects or
destabilization of democracy.
The first of these conditions is stateness understood as the ability of the state
to pursue the monopoly of legitimate physical force. Following Linz and Stepan,
a modern state is indispensable for democracy. Stateness is on the one hand
seen to be problematic when the territorial boundaries and the eligibility for
citizenship are disputed. On the other hand, stateness implies a capable admin-
istration. As Linz and Stepan put it, democracy relies on ‘the effective capacity
to command, regulate, and extract’. The bureaucracy must be usable by the
democratic government.53 Thus, an intact state with a functioning administration
is seen as one characteristic of the environment into which democracy is
embedded.54
The second external context condition is the presence of civil society. This is
the ‘arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individ-
uals, relatively autonomously from the state, attempt to articulate values, create
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests’.55 The importance of
this context condition stems from the assumption that a well-developed civil
society strengthens democracy by generating and enabling ‘checks of power,
responsibility, societal inclusion, tolerance, fairness, trust, cooperation, and often
also the efficient implementation of accepted political programs’.56
The last external condition that has an influence on the state of democracy is
the socio-economic context. On the one hand, this condition accounts for the link
between economic development and the capability to sustain democracy, which
has proven to be very stable.57 On the other hand it reminds us that a certain level
of socio-economic equality is necessary for meaningful political equality: ‘Only
when citizens are secured and educated by means of a sufficiently developed
social and economic status will they be able to form independent opinions as
citoyens’ and participate in the political process.58
52 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 44.
53 Linz & Stepan, supra n. 41, Chs 2 and 11.
54 A. Croissant, ‘Analyse defekter Demokratien’, in Analyse demokratischer Regierungssysteme,
ed. K.H. Schrenk & M. Soldner (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), 97.
55 Linz & Stepan, supra n. 41, at 7.
56 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 47.
57 R. Inglehart & Ch. Welzel, ‘How Development Leads to Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 88,
no. 2 (2009): 33–48.
58 Merkel, supra n. 41, at 45; see also G.A. O’Donnell, ‘Democracy, Law, and Comparative
Politics’, Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 27–29.
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On this basis, we distinguish five possible types of democracy promotion that
differ with regard to the substance that is being promoted. Theoretically, the
substance of EU democracy promotion could be as follows:
– I. Externally embedded liberal democracy promotion: besides the five
partial regimes, the EU also significantly supports the advancement of
the external conditions.
– II. Liberal democracy promotion: the EU mainly promotes the five partial
regimes of liberal democracy.
– III. Partial liberal democracy promotion: the EU mainly promotes some
partial regimes while it neglects others, for example, ‘electoralism’.
– IV. External conditions democracy promotion: the EU mainly supports the
advancement of the external conditions.
– V. No liberal democracy promotion: there are no activities related to the
support of any partial regime or context condition (even though the EU
may refer to some actions as democracy promotion).
We can map the substance of EU democracy promotion in third countries in
the following way, distinguishing between a ‘full’, ‘broad’, ‘narrow’ and
‘shallow’ liberal democracy promotion agenda:
Figure 2 EU Democracy Promotion Agendas
Emphasis on
promotion of partial
regimes of liberal
democracy
Full agenda
(Type II)
Broad agenda
(Type I)
Narrow agenda
(Type III)
Shallow agenda
(Type IV)
Empty agenda 0
(Type V) Emphasis on
promotion of context
conditions 
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In order to map the substance of EU democracy promotion, we do not only take
into account activities that are explicitly labelled as such but every activity that is
potentially conductive to the development of any of the partial regimes or context
conditions. Conversely, activities labelled as democracy promotion are only
counted as such when they are designed to develop any of the partial regimes
or context conditions (regardless of their actual effectiveness).
The terms ‘narrow’ and ‘shallow’ are not meant to refer to a ‘worse’ form of
EU democracy promotion. The EU might have good reasons not to pursue a
broad democracy promotion strategy in a certain country (e.g., because the state
of democracy is already rather advanced in a third country or because the third
country government’s willingness to cooperate on democracy promotion is low).
Thus, the main aim is to map the substance rather than engaging in a normative
critique of the EU’s policies.
IV What Factors Shape the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion?
Having outlined a framework for identifying the substance(s) of EU democracy
promotion, the question arises which type(s) of EU democracy promotion we can
expect. In this section, we will explore a number of expectations that are based on
the existing literature. Given the exploratory nature of this special issue, these are
not (yet) hypotheses that will be systematically tested. However, the expectations
outlined below go beyond mere description and should facilitate the construction
of hypotheses for further research.
At the most fundamental level, we can formulate two possible general scenar-
ios for the substance of EU democracy promotion. The first one follows an
essentialist understanding of EU democracy promotion and suggests that the
EU advances broadly the same content in different third countries. Alternatively,
we could expect that the substance of EU democracy promotion is contingent on
a range of factors and that the EU significantly differentiates the content between
various countries and/or regions. Below we formulate expectations regarding the
two scenarios.
1. One-Size-Fits-All Scenario
This scenario is based on the expectation that the EU promotes the same
substance around the world. Indeed, scholars of EU democracy promotion have
come to the conclusion that in its democracy promotion activities ‘the EU follows
one single cultural script [ . . . ] across the globe’.59 This finding suggests an
essentialist take on the substance of EU democracy promotion. It is plausible to
59 Bo¨rzel & Risse, supra n. 3, at 48.
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expect that the EU externalizes its internal model of democracy to third countries
regardless of other factors, be it consciously or unreflexively. The expectation
that the EU consciously exports the internal model of democracy is backed by the
domestic analogy – an instrument that has been used to detect the basic patterns
in the substance or content of the EU’s foreign policy including democracy
promotion.60 Applied to the foreign policies of states and – as Peters and Wagner
argue – the EU, the domestic analogy postulates that these ‘want to see their
international environment ordered according to the same values and principles
governing their own political and social system’.61 From a sociological institu-
tionalist understanding of EU foreign policy, it can be expected that the EU
unreflexively promotes institutional isomorphism, as a default option.62 Thus, the
following general expectation can be formulated:
The EU promotes the same substance around the world without significant
differentiation, which is inspired by its own ‘democratic condition’
What would this substance be? With regard to this question, several different
expectations can be formulated. They emerge from different understandings of
the EU’s internal model of democracy. First, the EU can be understood to be
founded among others on the ‘core norm’ of democracy, which is at the same
time an objective of its external policies.63 This ‘democratic condition’ originally
related to the political regimes of the Member States but has been formalized in
the Treaty of Amsterdam.64 Given this process of internal constitutionalization of
democracy as a core norm and the development of a foreign policy role that
conceives the EU as an international democracy promoter,65 it can be expected
that the EU particularly advocates liberal democracy without differentiation
60 D. Peters & W. Wagner, ‘Die Europa¨ische Union in den internationalen Beziehungen’, in Die
Europa¨ische Union: Theorien und Analysekonzepte, ed. K. Holzinger et al. (Paderborn: Scho¨ningh,
2005), 215–272; A. Ju¨nemann & M. Knodt, ‘Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung der Europa¨ischen
Union. Die Instrumentenwahl der EU aus vergleichender Perspektive’, Integration 29, no. 4
(2006): 287.
61 G. Kittel, V. Rittberger & F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Staatenmerkmale und Außenpolitik: Unter-
suchungsdesign und Hypothesen’, in Anpassung oder Austritt: Industriestaaten in der UNESCO-
Krise, ed. V. Rittberger (Berlin: Ed. Sigma, 1995), 68, translation taken from H. Boekle, V.
Rittberger & W. Wagner, ‘Norms and Foreign Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory’,
Tu¨binger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 34a (Tu¨bingen,
1999), 19.
62 Bicchi, supra n. 17.
63 I. Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–258.
64 P. Magnette & K. Nicolaı¨dis, ‘The European Union’s Democratic Agenda’, in The European
Union and Global Governance, ed. M. Telo` (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), 46–48.
65 Ju¨nemann, supra n. 12, at 161.
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around the world. For example, Manners suggests that the EU aims to spread
‘consensual democracy’, with an emphasis on power sharing and proportional
representation, in line with the democratic model of the EU and the majority of
EU Member States.66
A. The EU promotes the partial regimes around the world without significant
differentiation (Type II for all countries).
Although the EU is committed to the norm of liberal democracy, the EU’s
institutional design differs from that of a state and thus also from the way in
which liberal democracy shapes the institutional setup of its Member States. With
initiatives such as the 2001 White Paper on European Governance, the EU tries to
introduce principles of civil society involvement that it deems important ‘for
establishing more democratic governance’.67 Thus, second, governance perspec-
tives emphasize the role of non-state actors and the dispersion of authority in the
EU’s multilevel polity. Consequently, it could be expected that:
B. The EU mainly promotes the development of civil society and the involve-
ment of non-state actors in the decision-making process (Type IV for all
countries with an emphasis on civil society).
However, some authors argue more straightforwardly that the ‘democratic defi-
cit’ is a myth. The EU’s democratic nature should not be assessed in relation to
the involvement of the legislative (input democracy) or non-state actors (gover-
nance perspective), but rather in terms of its capacity to perform its core mandate,
which is to establish market integration. The creation of deeper markets (e.g.,
internal market) and regulatory functions (e.g., competition, central banking),
which correct market failure, constitutes the main function of the EU. These are
matters of low political salience, which are best delegated to a more technocratic
level in order to be successful (output democracy).68 This perspective may also
inform the EU’s notion of democracy promotion externally. Indeed, some scho-
lars stress that the EU’s ‘good governance’ or ‘democratic governance’ agenda
towards third countries aims to create market societies. The external governance
agenda would favour a neoliberal, technocratic approach to governance reform.69
For example, in relation to the southern Mediterranean region, Holden suggests
66 Manners, 2008, supra n. 8, at 50.
67 European Commission, ‘European Governance. A White Paper’, COM (2001) 428 final.
68 See A. Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 603–624; G. Majone,
‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, West European Politics 17, no. 3 (1994), 77–101.
69 For example, W. Hout, ‘Governance and Development: Changing EU Policies’, Third World
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2010): 1–12.
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that the EU’s liberal democratic objectives are translated into (neo)liberal eco-
nomic goals.70 Thus, from this third perspective, it can be expected that:
C. The EU mainly promotes good governance, governance capacity and func-
tioning administration, in line with its market enhancing objectives (Type IV
for all countries with an emphasis on ‘stateness’).
In contrast, it may be argued that the ‘European social model’ constitutes a main
characteristic of EU democracy. This view is particularly widespread in
European policy circles where European welfare arrangements are often opposed
to the more liberal democratic model in the United States.71 When asked what
distinguished the EU democratic model and subsequently influences its democ-
racy promotion policies, one EU official emphasized that it is the welfare state
component. According to this official, the EU pursues a broad democratic agenda
in line with international conventions such as, for example, the Universal Dec-
laration on Human Rights, but in addition to this, it also aims to deliver welfare in
third countries.72 Indeed, the EU explicitly refers to its own internal experience
through its international commitment to the ‘social dimension of globalization’
and the ‘decent work agenda’. The EU’s comprehensive global social agenda
links the objectives of core labour standards, social protection, social dialogue
and employment, with other normative external policy goals such as develop-
ment, democracy and human rights.73 In the framework of the special issue, this
would mean that a ‘full’ democratic agenda is being promoted in non-EU
countries and regions, namely Type II for all countries with an additional
emphasis on the ‘fair distribution’ dimension of socio-economic development.
D. The EU mainly promotes elements of social-democratic systems, in line with
the so-called European social model (Type II with an additional emphasis on
the ‘fair distribution’ dimension of socio-economic development’)
2. Differentiation Scenario
This alternative scenario is based on the expectation that the substance of EU
democracy promotion around the world is not so much driven by the same
70 P. Holden, In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
71 For example, R. Youngs, ‘European Approaches to Democracy Assistance: Learning the
Right Lessons?’, Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2003): 130.
72 Interview, European External Action Service, 12 May 2011.
73 See, e.g., European Commission, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalisation – the EU’s Policy
Contribution on Extending the Benefits to All’, COM (2004) 383; European Commission, ‘Pro-
moting Decent Work for All: The EU Contribution to the Implementation of the Decent Work
Agenda in the World’, COM (2006) 249.
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underlying ‘theme’ but rather that there is considerable variation in the content
that goes beyond mere differences in emphasis. In this scenario, we would expect
differences in the very ‘quality’ of the substance.
The EU qualitatively differentiates the substance of its democracy promotion
activities around the world.
Such variation may be due to different factors. Although the literature on
democracy promotion has not systematically paid attention to the explanation of
the substance it has dealt with factors that determine the usage of instruments. By
way of analogy, we could expect that differentiation of substance may be caused
by variation in the following:
(1) The power structure between the EU and third countries (asymmetrical
interdependence): Asymmetries in power were found to impact on the
EU’s external governance more generally74 and on EU democracy pro-
motion more particularly.75
(2) EU or Member State interests in third countries: The EU’s objective of
democracy promotion was found to be compromised when it clashed
with other interests.76 In this regard, EU democracy promotion is in line
with a more general trend.77
(3) The EU’s specific ‘diagnosis’ on the domestic state of democracy in third
countries and subsequent individual response: With regard to EU democ-
racy promotion instruments, scholars have found that their usage depends
‘enormously’ on the particular perception of the national or regional
context in which they are employed.78
(4) The degree of cooperativeness of the third countries: Studies on EU
democracy promotion have drawn attention to the importance of respon-
siveness of the political elite and civil society to EU cooperation.
In particular the degree of pluralism and consequently the willingness
to cooperate were identified as factors that impact the EU’s democracy
promotion strategy.79
74 S. Lavenex & F. Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External
Governance in European Politics’, Journal of European Public Policy 16, no.6 (2009): 791–812.
75 A. Ju¨nemann & M. Knodt, ‘Explaining EU-Instruments and Strategies of EU Democracy
Promotion. Concluding Remarks’, in Externe Demokratiefo¨rderung durch die Europa¨ische Union,
ed. A. Ju¨nemann & M. Knodt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 357–358; R. Youngs, ‘Democracy
Promotion as External Governance?’, Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 901.
76 Ju¨nemann & Knodt, 2006, supra n. 60, at 353–355, 362–363.
77 P.J. Schraeder, ‘The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint
European-North American Research Network’, Democratization, 10, no. 2 (2003): 21–44.
78 Bo¨rzel & Risse, supra n. 3, at 48.
79 Ju¨nemann & Knodt, 2006, supra n. 60, at 360–361.
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(5) The paradigms on democracy promotion embodied in different regional
institutional environments: Scholars found that rather than using a single
standard, the EU draws from several sources when defining the kind of
democracy that it wants to promote towards third countries. While it
refers to CSCE standards such as the 1990 ‘Charter of Paris for a new
Europe’ in its relations with European countries it has defined own
standards with regard to developing countries.80
(6) The geographical proximity of the third countries: A comparison between
neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries has shown that the EU
responded more consistently and more forcefully to non-compliance with
democratic norms in the geographically close countries.81
Should we find pronounced variation in the substance of EU democracy
promotion, these factors could be tested more systematically in further research.
For the time being, the aim of the special issue is to map the substance of EU
democracy promotion across a variety of countries and regions and to establish
which of the two basic scenarios EU democracy promotion it follows.
V Contributions of this Special Issue
Each contribution to this special issue addresses the EU’s democracy promotion
activities in a particular region. Most authors have focused specifically on two or
three countries within the region. Their analysis is based on the common research
question about the substance(s) of EU democracy promotion and on the concepts
and expectations that are outlined in this introduction. However, rather than
rigidly applying the framework and identifying components and, subsequently,
types and agendas formulated in this introductory article, there is diversity of
approaches and perspectives. Some authors look at particular components of the
framework, for example, the triangle of state-market-civil society, while others
consider the importance of particular factors shaping the substance of EU democ-
racy promotion, for example, non-EU donors or domestic factors, and still others
outline some general trends in the content of EU democracy promotion policy,
for example, the new emphasis on democratic governance. While most contribu-
tions are of an empirical nature, some also reflect on the conceptual framework of
liberal democracy. The concluding reflections complete the special issue by
offering an outlook on the topic.
Starting with the closest and arguably the most successful EU foreign policy
domain, Eline De Ridder and Dimitry Kochenov examine the enlargement
80 Smith, supra n. 15, at 153–154.
81 Warkotsch, supra n. 15, at 230–231; S. Maier & F. Schimmelfennig, ‘Shared Values:
Democracy and Human Rights’, in Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?,
ed. K. Weber, M.E. Smith & M. Baun (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 45.
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process of the Central and Eastern European countries. Focusing specifically on
the mechanism of democratic conditionality towards the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, the authors emphasize the vagueness and inconsistencies in the EU’s
approach. The EU did not have a well-defined view on what specific democratic
institutions should be promoted through the accession process. Despite its
emphasis on the Copenhagen political criteria, their content has never been
clearly explained, meaning that candidate countries had to comply with ‘ad hoc
demands’ and ‘with the unknown’. While the two countries were already quite
advanced on the way to democracy (with some protraction in the Slovak case)
there were nevertheless some problematic issues, which, however, the EU
ignored or addressed only superficially. Thus, while rhetorically the EU empha-
sizes all the partial regimes of the conceptual framework, in practice, this seems
like ‘ambitious window dressing’. Furthermore, De Ridder and Kochenov show
that Slovakia remained ‘stigmatized’ throughout the accession process, even
though it had caught up regarding its democratic development. This entailed that
the country was continuously treated differently from the Czech Republic and
had to perform better than its neighbour in order to receive a positive assessment
of its progress. This testifies to the authors’ claim of a lack of equal standards.
The latter is partly attributed to the Commission’s limited experience in the field
of democracy, which is not part of the acquis communautaire.
The next article moves further eastwards, studying the EU’s policies in the
Eastern neighbourhood. Susan Stewart brings out the contrast in democracy related
content between the EU’s policies towards the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
Following an analysis of the democracy provisions in the main documents, she
contextualizes the EU’s democracy promotion policies towards Russia and Ukraine
and then systematically evaluates the importance of the different components of
the liberal democracy framework as elaborated in the introduction. Similar to the
findings in the previous article, the EU’s rhetoric hints to a broad liberal democracy
agenda, including (almost) all the partial regimes and external context conditions.
However, even at the rhetorical level it becomes clear that the democracy related
content of EU’s policy towards Russia is superficial and les far-reaching and can
be summarized as narrow democracy promotion with attention to all external
conditions. In contrast, a broad democracy agenda has been promoted towards
Ukraine. The latter leaves sufficient flexibility to take domestic developments into
account and the EU has shown a learning process over the past decade. In the
conclusion, the author gives some explanations for these findings, pointing to
differences in domestic receptiveness in Russia and Ukraine as well as interest-
based considerations from the side of the EU.
Shifting towards the southern neighbourhood, Vicky Reynaert provides a
critical reflection of the EU as a ‘shallow democracy’ promoter. This article
focuses on the external conditions of the conceptual framework and more spe-
cifically on the EU’s insistence on market-driven reforms. The author argues not
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only that a preoccupation with neoliberal economic measures has overshadowed
democracy-related objectives but also that the market reforms themselves (e.g.,
supporting the Aqaba Special Economic zone in Jordan) have contributed to a
growing inequality and a lack of liberty. In turn, these constitute the root causes
for the recent protests and revolutions in the southern Mediterranean region.
Highlighting the importance of the so-called ‘external conditions’ of the concep-
tual framework, Reynaert’s analysis is based on the ‘democratic triangle’
between the state, the market and civil society. While these three aspects should
be balanced, she shows that the EU’s main concern has been the market. EU
support for the state apparatus often serves to enhance the functioning of the
market (e.g., under the banner of good governance), and the promotion of a civil
society contributes to the legitimization of the neoliberal state. Even if the EU
believes that such an emphasis on economic liberalization will lead to develop-
ment and eventually to democratization, Reynaert argues that the EU’s approach
negatively affects liberty and equality in the region. While the EU has come up
with new concepts such as ‘deep democracy’ towards the region after the
beginning of the protests there does not seem to be a U-turn in its policy with
regard to the relationship between state and market. Eventually, implementation
will show whether the EU’s policy has changed.
Examining the case of Central Asia, Fabienne Bossuyt and Paul Kubicek also
argue that EU democracy promotion activities mainly concern the ‘external
conditions’ of the democracy framework. As in the previous article, it seems
that the EU favours a long-term approach to democratization whereby the
improvement of external conditions, in particular, the socio-economic context,
should lead to political liberalization and democratization. However, there also
appear fundamental differences between the two regions. Rather than emphasiz-
ing market-based reforms that characterized the EU’s relations with the Medi-
terranean, the EU’s socio-economic agenda towards Central Asia seems more
informed by developmental objectives such as poverty reduction and education.
Moreover, the authors emphasize that the EU does not have a one-size-fits-all
approach towards the region. Rather, it has increasingly pursued a differentiated
approach towards the five countries of the Central Asian region, adjusting the
substance of its democracy promotion policies according to the domestic context.
The authors hypothesize that the EU has a broader liberal democracy promotion
agenda towards those countries that show some commitment to political liberal-
ization (e.g., Kyrgyzstan) and a more narrow or shallow liberal democracy
promotion agenda toward states that oppose any democratic openings (e.g.,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Although their research largely confirms the
thesis that domestic resonance matters for the EU, Bossuyt and Kubicek add that
strategic considerations also play an important role.
Subsequently, Karen Del Biondo addresses the EU’s democracy promotion
towards sub-Saharan Africa. This article starts from the observation that the EU
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promotes a broad ‘democratic governance’ agenda towards this region, inspired
by international development paradigms. This agenda includes both the partial
regimes and the external conditions of the conceptual framework (as well as
some additional issues whose relation to democracy is debatable). However,
some qualifications are being made in relation to the EU’s holistic and ambitious
approach. First, there is also differentiation in the substance promoted towards
sub-Saharan African countries, based on the countries’ particular needs and their
degree of cooperativeness. Second, the external conditions of ‘stateness’, ‘civil
society’ and ‘socio-economic development’ are supported more often than the
partial regimes of liberal democracy, and these objectives are not always aimed at
democracy promotion in the sub-Saharan African countries. For example,
strengthening governments’ administrative capacity and the participation of
non-state actors has mainly been meant to enhance aid effectiveness. Third, when
focusing on political conditionality and on aid sanctions under Article 96 of the
Cotonou Agreement, the EU’s approach has been much more limited to flaws in
the electoral regime. For example, the resumption of aid has mainly been related
to improvements in the electoral process. The article’s conclusions outline a
number of explanations for the difference between a broad democratic gover-
nance agenda and the narrow application of political conditionality.
Still within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, the next article looks at
the EU’s policy towards the South Pacific. Maurizio Carbone analyses the EU’s
democracy promotion efforts since the late 1990s. While these were originally
focused on socio-economic development instead of democracy promotion as
such, the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Strategy for Pacific Islands
(2006) introduced a new approach that emphasized political dialogue at the
inter-regional level. However, the author argues that through its view of ‘region-
alism as the solution of all problems’, and specifically through its commitment to
engage with the Pacific Islands Forum, the EU has in fact delegated the definition
of the substance of democracy promotion to Australia and New Zealand.
In conclusion, the substance of EU democracy promotion towards the South
Pacific is not so much influenced by interests and power relations between both
regions or by the domestic context of the targeted countries, but rather by the
EU’s entrapment in its own commitment to regionalism. However, there are
indications that the EU has recently become less reliant on Australia and New
Zealand, taking a more self-confident approach towards defining the substance of
its democracy promotion policy. The creation of the ACP-wide Governance
Incentive Tranche illustrates this point, although the author points to several
flaws in this new system, which may jeopardize the EU’s image as a promoter of
democracy and good governance.
Subsequently, Susanne Gratius analyses the EU’s democracy promotion
policies towards Latin America. The author emphasizes that the mutual commit-
ment to democracy reflects more a tradition than a policy. While both regions
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share a long history of democracy building, the return to electoral democracy in
Latin America also implied that the EU’s political role in the region was dimin-
ished. The article makes clear that the EU’s policies are mostly aimed at
economic development, social progress (arguably in line with the EU’s ‘social
democracy model’), technical governance projects, and human rights issues, but
that the focus on this particular substance does not stem from a coherent approach
to democracy promotion in Latin America. In addition, trade interests (e.g., the
free trade agreement with Colombia) and security considerations (e.g., supporting
counter-terrorist measures since after 9/11), partly based on Spain’s strong pre-
ferences in the region, have hindered a ‘broader’ democracy promotion agenda.
The author argues that the EU fails to address ‘the real problem with democracy
in Latin America: the authoritarian temptation within a democratic fac¸ade’.
Furthermore, the European model of liberal democracy is being challenged by
new democratic formulas that are also used to justify authoritarian practices, such
as the participative or direct democracy discourses. Examining the three ‘most
problematic countries’ – Cuba, Colombia and Venezuela – Gratius concludes that
the substance of EU democracy promotion is strongly influenced by the ‘transi-
tion paradigm’ and by target countries’ limited cooperativeness. The EU’s
policies have a strong government focus, even if it concerns (semi-)authoritarian
regimes, which clashes with human rights concerns and marginalizes the role of
political parties and non-governmental organizations that used to be the main
beneficiaries of EU democracy activities in Latin America during the 1980s.
In conclusion, current EU democracy promotion activities towards Latin America
lean towards a shallow agenda.
Finally, we formulate our conclusions on the substance of EU democracy
promotion. The main findings of the special issue are summarized in a table,
which includes both the components of the embedded democracy framework and
the various countries and regions that are examined. This mapping exercise
allows us to evaluate what kind of democracy the EU promotes. At the same
time it is the basis for our elaboration of tentative explanations for the research
findings. Although some variation can be discerned within the embedded democ-
racy framework and across the different countries and regions, we distil three
common observations on the substance of EU democracy promotion: (1) the
focus on elections has been more limited than expected, (2) the EU has largely
focused on the external context conditions, and (3) the links between the latter
and the partial regimes of the embedded democracy framework are under-
specified. More generally, it appears that the EU is balancing between a narrow
and shallow agenda of democracy promotion, which basically reflects the internal
democratic condition of the EU. The conclusion also formulates several sugges-
tions for further research.
In his concluding reflections, Frank Schimmelfennig analyses the academic
merit of studying the substance of EU democracy promotion. He finds that the
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issue is worth exploring further and outlines some approaches that could guide
such an endeavour. In particular, he points to the relevance of democracy
promoters’ beliefs and the characteristics of the policy-making process. Further-
more, he demands that the study of substance is connected to the study of
instruments and strategies in order find out whether substance matters. Some of
these suggestions will be taken up in the next phase of the project.
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